GhostImage: Remote Perception Attacks against Camera-based Image
  Classification Systems by Man, Yanmao et al.
GhostImage: Remote Perception Attacks against
Camera-based Image Classification Systems
Yanmao Man1, Ming Li1, and Ryan Gerdes2
1University of Arizona
2Virginia Tech
Abstract—In vision-based object classification systems imaging
sensors perceive the environment and machine learning is then
used to detect and classify objects for decision-making purposes;
e.g., to maneuver an automated vehicle around an obstacle or to
raise an alarm to indicate the presence of an intruder in surveil-
lance settings. In this work we demonstrate how the perception
domain can be remotely and unobtrusively exploited to enable an
attacker to create spurious objects or alter an existing object. An
automated system relying on a detection/classification framework
subject to our attack could be made to undertake actions with
catastrophic results due to attacker-induced misperception.
We focus on camera-based systems and show that it is possible
to remotely project adversarial patterns into camera systems by
exploiting two common effects in optical imaging systems, viz.,
lens flare/ghost effects and auto-exposure control. To improve the
robustness of the attack to channel effects, we generate optimal
patterns by integrating adversarial machine learning techniques
with a trained end-to-end channel model. We experimentally
demonstrate our attacks using a low-cost projector, on three
different image datasets, in indoor and outdoor environments,
and with three different cameras. Experimental results show that,
depending on the projector-camera distance, attack success rates
can reach as high as 100% and under targeted conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Object detection and classification have been widely adopted
in autonomous systems, such as automated vehicles [1]–[3]
and unmanned aerial vehicles [4], [5], as well as surveillance
systems, e.g., smart home monitoring systems [6], [7]. These
systems first perceive the surrounding environment via sensors
(e.g., cameras, LiDARs, and motion sensors) that convert analog
signals into digital data, then try to understand the environment
using object detectors and classifiers (e.g., recognizing traffic
signs or unauthorized persons), and finally make a decision on
how to influence/interact with the environment (e.g., a vehicle
may decelerate or a surveillance system raises an alarm).
While the cyber (digital) attack surface of such systems have
been widely studied [8]–[11], vulnerabilities in the perception
domain are less well-known, despite perception being the
first and critical step in the decision-making pipeline. That
is, if sensors can be compromised then false data can be
injected and the decision making process will indubitably
be harmed as the system is not acting on an accurate view
of its environment. Recent work has demonstrated false
data injection against sensors in a remote manner via either
electromagnetic (radio frequency) interference [12], laser pulses
(against microphones [13], or LiDARs [14]–[16]), and acoustic
waves [17], [18]. These perception domain sensor attacks
(a) Projector off (b) Projector on
Figure 1: A STOP sign image was injected into a camera by
a projector, which was detected by YOLOv3 [21].
alter the data at the source, hence bypassing traditional digital
defenses (such as crypto-based authentication or access control),
and are subsequently much harder to defend against [19], [20].
These attacks can also be remote in that the attacker needn’t
physically contact/access/modify devices or objects.
Among the aforementioned sensors, at least for automated
systems in the transportation and surveillance domains, cameras
are more common/crucial. Existing remote attacks against
cameras are limited to, essentially, denial-of-service attacks
[15], [22], [23], which are easily detectable (e.g., by tampering
detection [24]) and for which effective mitigation strategies
exist (e.g., by sensor fusion [25]). In this work, we consider
attacks that cause camera-based image classification system
to either misperceive actual objects or perceive non-existent
objects by remotely injecting light-based interference into a
camera, without blinding it. Formally, we consider creation
attacks whereby a spurious object (e.g., a non-existent traffic
sign, or obstacle) is seen to exist in the environment by a
camera, and alteration attacks, in which an existing object in
the camera view is changed into another attacker-determined
object (e.g., changing a STOP sign to a YIELD sign or changing
an intruder into a bicycle).
As it is not possible, due to optical principles, to directly
project an image into a camera, we propose to exploit two com-
mon effects in optical imaging systems, viz., lens flare effects
and exposure control to induce camera-based misperception.
The former effect is due to the imperfection of lenses, which
causes light beams to be refracted and reflected multiple times
resulting in polygon-shape artifacts (a.k.a., ghosts) to appear in
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images [26], [27]. Since ghosts and their light sources typically
appear at different locations, an attacker can overlap specially
crafted ghosts with the target object’s without having the light
source blocking it. Auto exposure control is a feature common
to cameras that determines the amount of light incident on the
imager and is used, for example, to make images look more
natural. An attacker can leverage exposure control to make
the background of an image darker and the ghosts brighter, so
as to make the ghosts more prominent (i.e., noticeable to the
detector/classifier) and thus increase attack success rates. Fig. 1
presents an example of a creation attack, where we used a
projector to inject an image of a STOP sign in a ghost, which
is detected and classified as a STOP sign by YOLOv3 [21], a
state-of-the-art object detector.
Theoretically arbitrary patterns can be injected via ghosts.
However, it is challenging to practically and precisely control
the ghosts, in terms of their resolutions and positions in images,
making arbitrary injection impracticable in some scenarios.
Hence, we propose an empirical projector-camera channel
model that predicts the resolution and color of injected ghost
patterns, as well as the location of ghosts, for a given projector-
camera arrangement. Experimental results show that at short
distances attack success rates are as high as 100%, but at longer
distances the rates decrease sharply; this is because at long
distances ghost resolutions are low, resulting in patterns that
cannot be recognized by the classifier.
To improve the efficacy of our attack, which we dub GhostIm-
age, especially at lower resolutions, we assume that the attacker
possesses knowledge about the image classification/detection
algorithm. Based on this knowledge the attacker is able to
formulate and solve an optimization problem to find optimal
attack patterns, of varying resolutions, to project that will be
recognized by the image classifier as the intended target class
[28], [29]; i.e., the pattern projected will yield a classification
result of the attacker’s choice. As the channel may distort the
injected image (in terms of color, brightness, and noise), we
extend our projector-camera model to include auto exposure
control and color calibration and integrate the channel model
into our optimization formulation. This results in a pattern
generation approach that is resistant to channel effects and thus
able to defeat a classifier under realistic conditions.
We use self-driving and surveillance systems as two illustra-
tive examples to demonstrate the potential impact of GhostIm-
age attacks. Proof-of-concept experiments were conducted with
different cameras, image datasets, and environmental conditions.
Results show that our attacks are able to achieve attack success
rates as high as 100%, depending on the projector-camera
distance. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We are the first to study remote perception attacks against
camera-based classification systems, whereby the attacker
induces misclassification of objects by injecting light, con-
veying adversarially generated patterns, into the camera.
• Our attack leverages optical effects/techniques, namely, lens
flare and auto-exposure control, that are widespread and
common, making the attack likely to be effective against
most cameras. Furthermore, we incorporate these effects in
an end-to-end manner into an adversarial machine learning-
based optimization framework to find the optimal patterns
an attacker should inject to cause misperception.
• We demonstrate the efficacy of the attacks through exper-
iments with varying image datasets, cameras, distances,
and indoor to outdoor environments. Results show that
GhostImage attacks are able to achieve attack success rates as
high as 100%, depending on the projector-camera distance.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
System and attack models are described, including two attack
objectives and the attacker’s capabilities.
A. System Model
We assume an end-to-end camera-based object classification
system (Fig. 2) in which a camera captures an image of a
scene with objects of interest. The image is then fed to an
object detector to crop out the areas of objects, and finally
these areas are given to a neural network to classify the objects.
Autonomous systems increasingly rely on such classification
systems to make decisions and actions. If the classification
result is incorrect (e.g., modified by an adversary), wrong
actions could be taken. For example, in a surveillance system,
if an intruder is not detected, the house may be broken-in
without raising an alarm.
B. Threat Model
We consider two different attack objectives. In creation
attacks the goal is to inject a spurious (i.e., non-existent)
object into the scene and have it be recognized (classified) as
though it were physically present. For alteration attacks an
attacker injects adversarial patterns over an object of interest
in the scene that causes the object to be misclassified.
There are two types of attackers with differing capabilities:
Camera-aware attackers who possess knowledge of the
victim’s camera (i.e., they do not know the configuration
of the lens system, nor post-processing algorithms, but they
can possess the same type of camera used in the target
system), from which they can train a channel model using the
camera as a black-box. With such capabilities, they are able to
achieve creation attacks and alteration attacks. System-aware
attackers not only possess the capabilities of the camera-aware
attackers, but also know about the image classifier including
its architecture and parameters, i.e., black-box attacks on the
camera but white-box attacks on the classifier. With such
capabilities, it is able to achieve creation attacks and alteration
attacks as well, but with higher attack success rates.
Both types of attackers are remote (unlike [34]), i.e., they
do not have access to the hardware or the firmware of the
victim camera, nor to the images that the camera captures. We
assume that both attackers are able to track and aim victim
cameras [16], [22], [35].
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will introduce optical imaging principles,
including flare/ghost effects and exposure control, which we
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Figure 2: Camera-based object classification systems. GhostImage attacks target the perception domain, i.e., the camera.
will exploit to realize GhostImage attacks. Then, we will
discuss the preliminaries about neural networks and adversarial
examples that we will use to enhance GhostImage attacks.
A. Optical Imaging Principles
Due to the optical principles of camera-based imaging
systems, it is not feasible to directly point a projector at a
camera, hoping that the projected patterns can appear at the
same location with the image of the targeted object, because
the projector has to obscure the object in order to make the
two images overlap. We prove this infeasibility in Appendix C.
Instead, we exploit lens flare effects and auto exposure control
to inject adversarial patterns.
Lens flare effects [27] refer to a phenomenon where one or
more undesirable artifacts appear on an image because bright
light get scattered or flared in a non-ideal lens system (Fig. 3).
Ideally, all light beams should pass directly through the lens and
reach the CMOS sensor. However, due to the quality of the lens
elements, a small portion of light gets reflected several times
within the lens system and then reaches the sensor, forming
multiple polygons (called “ghosts”) on the image. The shape of
polygons depends on the shape of the aperture. For example, if
the aperture has six sides, there will be hexagon-shaped ghosts
in the image. Normally ghosts are very weak and one cannot
see them, but when a strong light source (such as the sun,
a light bulb, a laser, or a projector) is present (unnecessarily
captured by the CMOS sensor, though [36]), the ghost effects
become visible. Fig. 3 shows only one reflection path, but there
are many other paths and that is why there are usually multiple
ghosts in an image.
Existing literature [27], [37], [38] about ghosts focused on
the simulation of ghosts given the detailed lens configurations,
in which the algorithms simulate every possible reflection path.
Aperture
CMOS Sensor
Ghost
Light Source
Figure 3: Ghost effect principle
Such white-box models are computationally expensive, and also
requires white-box knowledge of internal lens configurations,
thus are not suitable for our purposes. In Sections IV and V,
we study flare effects in a black-box manner (more general than
Vitoria et al. [39]), where we train a lightweight end-to-end
model that is able to predict the locations of ghosts, estimate
the resolutions within ghost areas, and also calibrate colors.
Exposure control mechanisms [40], [41] are often equipped
in cameras to adjust brightness by changing the size of the
aperture or the exposure time. In this work, we will model
and exploit auto exposure control to manipulate the brightness
balance between the targeted object and the injected attack
patterns in ghosts.
B. Neural Nets and Adversarial Examples
We abstract a neural network as a function Y = fθ(x) and
we omit the details of it due to the page limit. The input
x ∈ Rw×h×3 (width, height and RGB channels) is an image,
Y ∈ Rm is the output vector, and θ is the parameters of the
network (which is fixed thus we omit it for convenience). A
softmax layer is usually added to the end of a neural network to
make sure that
∑m
i=1 Yi = 1 and Yi ∈ [0, 1]. The classification
result is C(x) = argmaxiYi. Also, the inputs to the softmax
layer are called logits and denoted as Z(x).
An adversarial example [28] is denoted as y, where y = x+
∆. Here, ∆ is additive noise that has the same dimensionality
with x. Given a benign image x and a target label t, an adversary
wants to find a ∆ such that C(x+∆) = t, i.e., targeted attacks.
Note that, in this paper, the magnitude of ∆ is not constrained
below a small threshold, since the perceived images are usually
not directly observed by human users. But we still try to
minimize it because it represents the attack power and cost.
IV. CAMERA-AWARE GHOSTIMAGE ATTACKS
In this section, we will discuss how a camera-aware attacker
is able to inject arbitrary patterns in the perceived image of the
victim camera using projectors. We will discuss the possibilities
of using other attack vectors in Section VII-B.
A. Technical Challenges
Since we assume that the attacker do not have access to
the images that the targeted camera captures, he/she will have
to be able to predict how ghosts might appear in the image.
First, the locations of ghosts should be predicted given the
relevant positions of the projector and the camera, so that the
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Figure 4: Capture and projection are reverses of each other.
attacker can align the ghost with the image of the object of
interest to achieve alteration attacks. Second, since a projector
can inject shapes in ghost areas, the attacker needs to find out
the maximum resolution of shapes that it can inject. Lastly,
it is also challenging to realize the attacks derived from the
position and resolution models above with a limited budget.
B. Ghost Pixel Coordinates
Given the pixel coordinates of the target object G (Fig. 4a),
we need to derive the real-world coordinates A′ of the projector
so that we know where to place the projector in order to let
one of the ghosts overlap with the image of the object. To do
this, we derive the relationship between G and A′ in two steps:
We first calculate the pixel coordinates of the light source A
given A′, and then we calculate G based on A.
Based on homogeneous coordinates [42], assuming the
camera is at the origin of the coordinate system, we have
(u, v, w)> = M · (x′, y′, z′, 1)>, (1)
where M is the camera’s geometric model [42], a 3×4 matrix.
M can be trained from another (similar) camera, and then
be applied to the victim camera. The coordinates of A is
then A = (xA, yA)> = (u/w, v/w)>, by the homogeneous
transformation. Note that, A does not have to appear in the
view of the camera, which makes the attack more stealthy (See
[36] and Fig. 19 in the appendix).
In order to find the relationship of the pixel coordinates
between light sources A and their ghosts G, we did a simple
experiment where we moved around a flashlight in front of the
camera [43], and recorded the pixel coordinates of the flashlight
and the ghosts. Similar to [39], we observe that, for each G,
we have AOI/OIG = rG (being constant), wherever A is
(Fig. 5), and r ∈ (−∞,∞). This means the feasible region for
the placement of the projector is large; to attack an autonomous
vehicle, for example, it can be located on an overbridge, on a
traffic island, or even in the preceding vehicle, or on a drone,
etc. Finally, given A = (xA, yA), OI = (xO, yO) and r,
G =
(
xO − (xA − xO)/r
yO − (yA − yO)/r
)
. (2)
With G’s coordinates, the attacker is able to predict the pixel
location of ghosts and try adjusting the position and orientation
(which implies the angle) of the light source in the real world
so as to align one or more ghosts with the image of the object,
whose pixel coordinates can be calculated using (1) similarly.
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Figure 5: Ghost position v.s. light source position. Crosses
are light source at different locations and the circles are the
according biggest ghosts (as examples).
C. Ghost Resolution
In our daily life, ghosts normally appear as pieces of single-
color polygon-shaped artifacts; this is because the light sources
that cause these regular ghosts are single-point sources of light
that have just one single color, such as light bulbs, flashlights,
etc. In this work, however, we find out that one is able to bring
patterns into these ghost areas by simply using a low-cost
projector, a special source of light that shines variant patterns
in variant colors. For example, in Fig. 1, an image of a STOP
sign that is projected by a projector, appears in one of the
ghost areas in the image; this is because the pixel resolution
of the projector is high enough that multiple light beams in
different colors (got reflected among lenses and then) go into
the same ghost. In this subsection, we study the resolution of
the patterns in ghost areas 1.
Let us first define the throwing ratio of a projector. In Fig. 4b,
let plane S be the projected screen (e.g. on a wall), whose height
and width are denoted as h and w, respectively. The distance
d = OSOI is called the throwing distance. The throwing ratio
of this projection is rthrow = d/w. The (physical) size of the
projected screen at the victim camera’s location is denoted
SO, a part of which is captured by the CMOS sensor of the
camera in the ghost area, and we denote the (physical) size of
that area as Sf . Let us also define the resolution of the entire
projected screen as PO in terms of pixels (e.g., 1024× 768),
and the resolution of the ghost as Pf . Clearly, there is a linear
relationship among them: Pf/PO = Sf/SO, where SO = wh.
Finally, we can calculate the resolution of the ghost given d
and rthrow:
Pf =
POSf
h
w
(
d
rthrow
)2 . (3)
Here, Sf is a constant because the size of the lens is fixed;
e.g., the camera [43] has Sf = 0.0156 cm2.
D. Attack Realization and Experiment Setup
According to Eq. 3, if the attacker wants to carry out long-
distance and high-resolution GhostImage attacks, it needs a
1We are interested in the resolution of the projector pixels, not camera
pixels; a projector pixel is usually captured by multiple camera pixels.
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Figure 6: (Left) Attack setup diagram. (Middle) In-lab experiment setup. (Right) Attack equipments: We replaced the original
lens of the NEC NP3150 Projector [44] with a Canon EFS 55-250 mm zoom lens [45].
projector with a large throwing ratio rthrow. However, the factory
longest-throw lenses (NEC NP05ZL Zoom Lens [46]) of our
projector can achieve a throwing ratio of maximum 7.2 (which
means 9×9 at one meter), and expensive (about $1600). Instead,
we use a cheap ($80) zoom lens (Fig. 6, right) [45] that was
originally designed for Canon cameras. In our experiments,
such a configuration is interestingly feasible2 (Fig. 6), achieving
the maximum throwing ratio of 20 when the focal length is
250 mm, which means that at a distance of one meter, 32×32-
resolution attacks can be achieved. See Sec. VII-A for more
discussion on lens and projector selection.
Fig. 6 (left) shows a general diagram of GhostImage attacks,
where the light source (i.e., a projector) is pointing at the camera
from the side, so that the camera can still capture the object
(e.g., a STOP sign) for alteration attacks. The light source
injects light interference (marked in blue) into the camera,
which gets reflected among the lenses of the camera, resulting
in ghosts that overlap with the object in the image. Accordingly,
a photo of our in-lab experiment setup is given in Fig. 6. The
Canon lens was loaded in the NEC projector, though it cannot
be seen in the photo. We will evaluate our attack on three
different cameras (Sec. VI-B3).
To mount a creation attack, the attacker computes the
maximum resolution Pf for the ghost with a distance d based on
(3), and then downsamples the target image to the resolution
Pf in order to fit in the ghost area. The attacker chooses
downsampling as a heuristic approach because he/she is not
aware of the classification algorithm. We present in Fig. 7
some examples of downsampling a STOP sign image.
To mount alteration attacks, in addition to (3) for downsam-
pling, the attacker also needs to consider the pixel coordinates
(Eq. 2) of the ghost because the attacker needs to align the ghost
2Because projectors and cameras are dual devices (Fig. 4), their lenses are
interchangeable.
(a) 32× 32 (b) 16× 16 (c) 8× 8 (d) 4× 4 (e) 2× 2
Figure 7: Downsampling examples. We actually upsampled
these images for the sake of presentation, otherwise they were
too tiny to show.
with the image of the object of interest so that the resulting,
combined image deceives the classifier.
E. GhostImage Attack Evaluation
We substantiate camera-aware attacks on an image classifi-
cation system that we envision would be used for automated
vehicles. Specifically, images, taken by an Aptina MT9M034
camera [43], are fed to a traffic sign image classifier trained on
the LISA dataset [48]. In Sec. VI, we will evaluate classification
systems for other applications, with different cameras and
different datasets.
1) Dataset and neural network architecture: In order to
train an unbiased classifier, we selected eight traffic signs from
the LISA dataset [48] (Table VI in Appendix A). The network
architecture (Table V in Appendix A) is identical to [30]. We
used 80% of samples from the balanced dataset to train the
network and the rest 20% to test the network; it achieved an
accuracy of 96%.
2) Evaluation methodology: The evaluation procedure for
alteration attacks is detailed in Algorithm 1 in which we iterated
five distances, m source classes, m target classes. For each
target class, we sampled k images randomly from the dataset.
For every combination, we first downsampled the target image
based on (3), and projected the image at the camera using
the NEC projector. We then took the captured image, cropped
out the ghost area, and used the classifier to classify it. If the
classification result is the target class, we count it as a successful
Algorithm 1: GhostImage Attack evaluation procedure (m:
number of classes)
1 Initialize qd = 0, for 1 ≤ d ≤ 5
2 for d = 1 · · · 5 do
3 Place camera d meters away from projector
4 for i = 1 · · ·m do
5 Place printed traffic sign of class i at background
6 for j = 1 · · ·m do
7 if i = j then continue
8 Y ← k randomly picked images of class j
9 for y ∈ Y do
10 Downsample y according to Eq. 3
11 Project and crop out y′
12 if y′ is classified as j then
13 qd ← qd + 1
14 Success rates: qd ← qd/(km2), for 1 ≤ d ≤ 5
Figure 8: Camera-aware attack examples at one meter in
perception domain. Left: Creating a Merge sign. Right: Altering
a STOP sign (in the background) into a Merge sign.
attack. The procedure for creation attacks is slightly different:
Rather than printed traffic signs, we placed a blackboard as
the background as it helped us locate the ghosts. Given a
throwing radio of 20 (thanks to the Canon lens) we evaluated
five different distances from one meter to five meters. Based
on (3), they resulted in 32 × 32, 16 × 16, 8 × 8, 4 × 4, and
2× 2 resolutions, respectively.
3) Results: The results about attack success rates of camera-
aware attacks at varying distances are shown in Table I (Fig. 8
illustrates two successful camera-aware attacks). For the digital
domain, we simply added attack images ∆ on benign images
x as y = (x + ∆)/‖x + ∆‖∞. Based on these experiments,
we observe: First, as the distance increases, the success rate
decreases. This is because lower-resolution images are less well
recognized by the classifier. Second, digital domain results are
better than perception domain one, because images are distorted
by the projector-camera channel effects. Third, creation attacks
result in higher success rates than alteration attacks do because
in alteration attacks there are benign images in the background,
encouraging the classifier to make correct classifications. We
will address these issues in the next section, so as to increase
the overall attack success rate.
V. SYSTEM-AWARE GHOSTIMAGE ATTACKS
There are some limitations of the camera-aware attack intro-
duced in the previous section. First, increasing distances results
in lower success rates because the classifier cannot recognize
the resulting low-resolution images. Second, there are large gaps
between digital domain results and perception domain results,
as channel effects (which cause the inconsistency between
the intended pixels and the perceived pixels) are not taken
into account. In this section, we resolve these limitations and
improve GhostImage attacks’ success rates by proposing a
framework which consists of a channel model that predicts
Table I: Camera-aware attack success rates
Distances Creation Attacks Alteration Attacks
(meter) Digital Perception Digital Perception
1 98% 41% 95% 33%
2 98% 36% 88% 33%
3 80% 34% 67% 34%
4 36% 15% 28% 10%
5 14% 10% 13% 0%
the pixels perceived by the camera, given the pixels as input
to the projector, as well as an optimization formulation based
on which the attacker can solve for optimal attack patterns
that cause misclassification by the target classifier with high
confidence.
A. Technical Challenges
First, the injected pixel values are often difficult to control
as they exhibit randomness due to variability of the channel
between the projector and the camera, thus the adversary is
not able to manipulate each pixel deterministically. Second, to
achieve optimal results, the attacker needs to precisely predict
the projected and perceived pixels, thus channel effects must
be modeled in an end-to-end manner, i.e., considering not only
the physical channel (air propagation), but also the internal
processes of the projector and the camera. Lastly, the resolution
of attack patterns is limited by distances and projector lens
(Eq. 3), thus the ghost patterns must be carefully designed to
fit the resolution with few degrees of freedom.
B. System-aware Attack Overview
The system-aware attacker aims to find optimal patterns
that can cause misclassification by the target classifier with
high confidence by taking advantage of the non-robustness
of the classifier [28]. We adopt an adversarial example-based
optimization formulation into GhostImage attacks, in which
the attacker tries to solve
∆∗ = arg min
∆
‖∆‖p + c · Ladv(y, t, θ), (4)
where ∆ is the digital attack pattern as input to the projector, y
is the perceived image of the object of interest under attacks, t
is the target class, and θ represents the targeted neural network.
‖·‖p is an `p-norm that measures the magnitude of a vector, and
Ladv is a loss function indicating how (un)successful ∆ is. Here,
we aim to minimize the power of the projector required for a
successful attack, meanwhile maximizing the successful chance
of attacks. The relative importance of these two objectives is
balanced by a constant c. In Sec. V-D, we will detail (4)
in terms of how we handle ∆ being a non-negative random
tensor that is also able to depict grid-style patterns in different
resolutions.
More importantly, in (4) y is the final perceived image used
as input to the classifier, which is estimated by our channel
model in an end-to-end style (Fig. 9), in which δ 3 is the input
to the projector, and y is the resulting image captured by the
camera. The model can be formulated as
y = g (hf (∆) + ho(x)) . (5)
where hf (∆) is the ghost model that estimates the perceived
adversarial pixel values in the ghost. For simplicity we let
ho(x) = x because the attacker possesses same type of the
camera so that x can be obtained a priori, and g(·) is the
3Different than ∆ which is a w × h × 3 tensor, δ is a single pixel with
dimension 3× 1 for the convenience of the analysis.
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Figure 9: Projector-camera channel model
auto exposure control that adjusts the brightness. Sec. V-C
introduces the derivation of (5).
Next, we will first present the channel model, and then
formulate the optimization problem for finding the optimal
adversarial ghost patterns.
C. Projector-Camera Channel Model
We consider the projector to camera channel model (Fig. 9)
in which δ is an RGB value the attacker wishes to project
which is later converted to an analog color by the projector.
The attacker can control the power (Pa) of the light source of
the projector so that the luminescence can be adjusted. The
targeted camera is situated at a distance of d, which captures
the light coming from both the projector and reflected off the
object (x). The illuminance received by the camera from the
projector is denoted as I. The camera converts analog signals
into digital ones, based on which it adjusts its exposure, with
the final RGB value being y. An ideal channel would yield
y = x+ δ but due to channel effects, we need to find a way to
adjust the projected RGB value such that the perceived RGB
value is as intended.
1) Exposure control: As we discussed in Section III-A,
cameras are usually equipped with auto-exposure control, where
according to the overall brightness of the image, the camera
adjusts its exposure by changing the exposure time, or the size
of its aperture, or both. We observed from our experiments that,
as we increase the luminescence of the projector (I), in the
image the brightness of the object (x) decreases but the ghost
(δ) does not decrease as much. Modeling such phenomena
helps the attacker to precisely predict the perceived image.
For the following, we will first find out how the illuminance
I depends on δ and Pa (the normalized power of light bulb
ranging from 0% to 100%), and then how y depends on I.
a) How does I depend on δ and Pa?: We conducted a
series of experiments, where Td = ‖δ‖∞ = maxi δi and Pa
were varied. We recorded the illuminance directly in front of
the camera using an illuminance meter [49], with the projector
one meter away. The results are plotted in Fig. 10, which shows
that
I(Td, Pa, d) = cd
d2
· Imax
1 + e−t
, (6)
where t = a×Td+b×Pa+ct, and a, b, cd and ct are constants
derived from the data. Imax is the maximum illuminance of
the projector at a distance of one meter. Such a sigmoid-like
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Figure 10: Illuminance depends on the RGB amplitude Td, and
the light bulb intensity Ta.
function captures the luminescence saturation property of the
projector hardware.
b) How does the perceived x depend on I?: In the same
experiments we also recorded the RGB value of the ghost (δ)
with a blackboard as background (in order to reduce ambient
impacts), and a piece of white paper (x) that was also on the
blackboard but did not overlay with the ghost. Their data are
shown in Fig. 11, from which we can derive the dimming ratio
that measures the change of exposure/brightness:
γ(I) = IenvI + Ienv , (7)
where Ienv is the ambient lighting condition in illuminance
which differs from indoors to outdoors for instances. From this
equation, we see that in an environment with static lighting
condition, as the luminescence of the projector increases, the
dimming ratio decreases, hence the objects become darker.
With (7), the adversary is able to conduct real-time attacks by
simply plugging in the momentary Ienv.
c) How does the perceived δ depend on I?: When x = 0,
‖yf‖ = ‖yf‖∞ (the lower subplot of Fig. 11) depends on I
in two ways:
‖yf‖(I) = γ(I) · ρ · I.
On one hand, the last term I increases the intensity of ghosts,
but on the other hand the dimming ratio γ(I) dims down ghost,
whereby ρ is a trainable constant. With this, we can rewrite
the perceived flare as
yf = ‖yf‖Hc δ‖δ‖ ,
where Hc is the color calibration matrix to deal with color
distortion, which will be discussed in Section V-C2. The term
1/‖δ‖ normalizes δ. In the end, we have the channel model
y = γ(I)
(
ρIHc δ‖δ‖ + x
)
. (8)
Compared to (5),
hf (δ) = ρIHc δ‖δ‖ , g(t) = γ(I)t, ho(x) = x.
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Figure 11: Perceived RGB values v.s. illuminance.
With (8), the attacker is able to predict how bright and what
colors/pixel values the ghost and the object will be, given the
projected pixels, the power of the projector, and the distance.
2) Color calibration: Considering a dark background (i.e.,
x = 0), (8) can be simplified as y = γ(I)ρIHcδ/‖δ‖, where
Hc is a 3× 3 matrix (as three color channels) that calibrates
colors. Both y and δ are 3 × 1 column vectors. Hc should
be an identity matrix for an ideal channel, but due to the
color-imperfection of both the projector and the camera, Hc
needs to be learned from data. To simplify notations, we define
corrected x and y as
xˆ =
δ
‖δ‖ , yˆ =
y
ρIγ(I) ,
so that we can write
yˆ = Hcxˆ.
We did another set of experiments where we collected n =
100 pairs of (xˆ, yˆ) with dark background (to make x = 0),
with δ being assigned randomly, and Pa = 30%. We grouped
them into X and Y :
X =
[
xˆ>1 , xˆ
>
2 , · · · , xˆ>n
]>
, Y =
[
yˆ>1 , yˆ
>
2 , · · · , yˆ>n
]>
,
where both X and Y are n× 3 matrices. We compute Hc by
solving
min
Hc
‖Y −XHc‖22.
This is known as a non-homogeneous least square problem [42],
and it has a closed-form solution:
Hc =
(
(X>X)−1X>Y
)>
.
Plugging Hc back to (8) completes our channel model.
3) Model validation: Fig. 12 demonstrates the accuracy of
our channel model. In it the left image is the original input to
the projector, the middle image is the estimated output from the
camera based on our channel model (Eq. 8), and the image on
the right is the actual image in a ghost captured by the camera.
As can be seen, the difference between the actual and predicted
is much less than the actual and original. While blurring effect
(a) Input xf (b) Estimated y (c) Actual y
Figure 12: An example of channel model prediction
is apparent in the actual y, we do not model it but the success
rates are still high despite it. As we will see in Section VI,
our channel model is general enough that once trained on one
camera in one environment, it can be transferred to different
environments and different cameras without retraining.
D. Optimal Adversarial Projection Patterns
In long-distance, low-resolution GhostImage attacks there
are only a few pixels in the ghost area. A camera-aware
attacker’s strategy is to simply downsample attack images
into low resolutions, but that does not result in high success
rates. While (4) is abstract, for the rest of this subsection, we
will progressively detail it and show how it can be solved in
light of the channel model to improve attack success rates. We
will start with the simplest case where adversarial perturbations
are random noise (Sec. V-A). Then, single-color ghosts will be
introduced. Later, we will consider how to find semi-positive
additive noise due to the fact that superposition can only
increase perceived light intensity but not decrease it. Finally,
we examine the optimization problem to find optimal ghost
patterns in grids at different resolutions.
1) Single-color ghost: Let us consider the simplest case first
where the random noise ∆ is drawn from one single Gaussian
distribution for all three channels, i.e., ∆ ∼ N (µ, σ2), where
the size of ∆ is w × h × 3 with w and h representing the
width and height of the benign image x. This is because
the values of each pixel that appear in the ghost area follow
Gaussian distributions according to statistics obtained from our
experiments. The adversary needs to find µ and σ such that
when ∆ is added to the benign image x, the resulting image
y will be classified as the target class t. That said, the logits
value (Section III-B) of the target class should be as high as
possible compared with the logits values of other classes [29].
Such a difference is measured by the loss function Ladv(y, t)
Ladv(y, t) = max
{
−κ,max
i:i6=t
{E[Zi(y)]} − E[Zt(y)]
}
, (9)
where E[Zi(y)] is the expectation of logits values at class i
of input y. Term maxi:i6=t{E[Zi(y)]} is the highest expected
logits value among all the classes except the target class t, while
E[Zt(y)] is the expected logits value of t. Here, κ controls
the logits gap between maxi:i6=t{E[Zi(y)]} and E[Zt(y)]; the
larger the κ is, the more confident that ∆ is successful. The
attacker needs Ladv as low as possible so that the neural
network would classify y as Class t. Most importantly, y
is computed based on our channel model (Eq. 8), so that the
optimizer finds the optimal ghost patterns that are resistant to
the channel effects. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of
neural networks, the expectations of logits values E[Zi(y)] are
hard to be expressed analytically; we instead use Monte Carlo
methods to approximate it:
Eˆ[Zi(y)] =
1
T
T∑
j=1
Zi(yj),
where T is the number of trials, and yj is of the j-th trial.
Meanwhile, the adversary also needs to minimize the
magnitude of ∆ to reduce the attack power and noticeability,
as well as its peak energy consumption, quantified by σ. The
expectation of the magnitude of ∆ is
E[‖∆‖p] = µn1/p, with n = 3wh. (10)
Putting (9) and (10) together with a tunable constant c, we
have our optimization problem for the simplest case
µ∗, σ∗ = arg min
µ,σ
E[‖∆‖p] + σ + c · Ladv(y, t),
subject to σ > σl,
Here, σl is the lower bound of the standard deviation σ,
meaning that the interference generator and the channel
environment can provide random noise with the standard
deviation of at least σl. When σl = 0, the adversary is able
to manipulate pixels deterministically. Therefore, when we fix
σ as σl in the optimization problem, the attack success rate
when deploying µ∗ would be the lower bound of the attack
success rate. In other words, the adversary equipped with an
attack setup that can produce noise with a lower variance (than
σ2l ) can carry out attacks with higher success rates. Therefore,
we can simplify our formulation by removing the constraint
about σ, so the optimization problem becomes
µ∗ = arg min
µ
E[‖∆‖p] + c · Ladv(y, t). (11)
For the rest of the paper we will simply use σ to denote σl.
Since in (11) there is only one variable that the adversary
is able to control, it is infeasible to launch a targeted attack
with such few degrees of freedom. As a result, the adversary
needs to manipulate each channel individually. That is, for
each channel, there will be an independent distribution from
which noise will be drawn. This is feasible because noise can
appear in different colors in the ghost areas in which three
channels are perturbed differently when using projectors. Let us
decompose ∆ as ∆ = [∆R,∆G,∆B ], where the dimension of
∆{R,G,B} is w×h, and they follow three independent Gaussian
distributions
∆R ∼ N
(
µR, σ
2
R
)
, ∆G ∼ N
(
µG, σ
2
G
)
, ∆B ∼ N
(
µB , σ
2
B
)
.
Here, µ{R,G,B} and σ{R,G,B} are the means and the standard
deviations (σ) of the three Gaussian distributions, respectively.
The expectation of such ∆ is then
E[‖∆‖p] =
[n
3
(µpR + µ
p
G + µ
p
B)
] 1
p
. (12)
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Figure 13: Biased penalty
(10) is a special case of (12) when µ = µR = µG = µB . We
denote µ = [µR, µG, µB ]>. Hence, similar to (11), we have
the optimization problem for single-color perturbation
µ∗ = arg min
µ
E[‖∆‖p] + c · Ladv(y, t), (13)
by which the adversary finds the optimal µ∗ from which ∆ is
drawn.
2) Non-negative noise constraint: (13) must be solved with
the constraint ∆ ≥ 0 because the adversary can only increase
the light. Rather than explicitly place a constraint in (13),
we propose to punish negative values, by intruducing biased
penalty
R(∆) = e−α(∆−ω) + eβ(∆−ω) − η, (14)
where
ω =
lnα− lnβ
α+ β
, η =
(
α
β
) −α
α+β
+
(
α
β
) β
α+β
.
Here ω is to center the global minimum at ∆ being zero, and
substracting η is to lower the minimum to be zero but it does
not change the optimization results so we will omit it. An
instance of (14) when α = 2 and β = 1 is plotted in Fig. 13 in
comparison with the L2 norm. With the same absolute value,
while the Lp norm treats positive perturbation and negative
perturbation equally, the biased penalty function punishes the
negative values more than the positive one, encouraging the
optimization algorithm to find positive ∆. We adopt it into our
optimization formulation
µ∗ = arg min
µ
E[R(∆)] + c · Ladv(y, t), (15)
and in the experiments we set α = 8 and β = 2.
3) Ghost grids: Since projector’s pixels are arranged in grids,
the attack patterns are in grids as well, especially in lower
resolutions. We enable ∆ with patterns in different resolutions.
Such a grid pattern∆ can be composed of several blocks ∆i,j,k,
i.e., ∆i,j,k : {1 ≤ i ≤ Nrow, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ncol, 1 ≤ k ≤ Nchn}
where Nrow, Ncol and Nchn is the number of rows, columns, and
channels of a grid pattern, respectively, in terms of blocks. In a
word, ∆i,j,k is the perturbation block at i-th row, j-th column
and k-th channel. A block ∆i,j,k is a random matrix and its size
is wNcol × hNrow , so that the size of ∆ is still w×h× 3. Besides,
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Figure 14: A grid pattern when Nrow = Ncol = 2 and
Nchn = 3. (a) µ is a three-dimensional matrix. (b) The resulting
perturbation pattern.
the elements in the random matrix ∆i,j,k is i.i.d. drawn from
a Gaussian distribution, i.e., ∆i,j,k ∼ N (µi,j,k, σ2).
The adversary can find the optimal grid pattern∆ by solving
the optimization problem as in (15) in which
E[R(∆)] =
Nrow∑
i=1
Ncol∑
j=1
Nchn∑
k=1
e−α(µi,j,k−ω) + eβ(µi,j,k−ω), (16)
where µi,j,k is the mean of the block ∆i,j,k. See Fig. 14a for
an illustration of the dimensionality of µi,j,k, and Fig. 14b for
the resulting pattern in color.
VI. SYSTEM-AWARE ATTACK EVALUATION
In this section, we consider camera-based image classifica-
tion systems, as used in self-driving vehicles and surveillance
systems, to illustrate the potential impact of our attacks. We
present proof-of-concept system-aware attacks in terms of
attack effectiveness, namely how well system-aware attacks per-
form in the same setup as camera-aware attacks (Section IV-E),
and attack robustness, namely how well system-aware attacks
are when being evaluated in different setups.
We will again use attack success rates (Algorithm 1) as
our metric. We used the Adam Optimizer [50] to solve our
optimization problems. There are two sets of results: Emulation
results refer to the classification results on emulated, combined
images of benign images and attack patterns using our channel
model (Equation 8). Emulation helps us conduct scalable
and fast evaluations of GhostImage attacks before conducting
real-world experiments4. Experimental results refer to the
classification results on the images that are actually captured
by the victim cameras when the projector is on.
A. Attack Effectiveness
To compare with camera-aware attacks, system-aware attacks
are evaluated in a similar procedure (Algorithm 1), targeting a
camera-based object classification system with the LISA dataset
4Source code is available at https://github.com/Harry1993/GhostImage
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Figure 15: System-aware creation and alteration
and its classifier, and the Aptina MT9M034 camera [43], in
an in-lab environment.
1) Creation attacks: For emulated creation attacks, all
distances (or all resolutions) yield attack success rates of
100% (Fig. 15), which means that our optimization problem is
easy to solve. In terms of computational overhead, we need
roughly 30 s per image at 2×2-resolution, and 10 s at 4×4 or
above (because of more degrees of freedom) using an NVIDIA
Tesla P100 [51]. Fig. 16a shows examples of emulated attack
patterns for creation attacks, along with the images of real
signs on the top. Interestingly, high-resolution shapes do look
like real signs. For example, we can see two vertical bars for
ADDEDLANE, and also we can see a circle at the middle
south for STOPAHEAD, etc. These results are consistent with
the ones from the MNIST dataset [52] where we could also
roughly observe the shapes of digits. Secondly, they are blue
tinted because our channel model suggests that ghosts tend
to be blue, thus the optimizer is trying to find “blue” attack
patterns that are able to deceive the classifier.
Interestingly, the all k resulting patterns of solving the
optimization problem targeting one class from k different
(random) starting points look similar to the ones shown in
Fig. 16a. However, CIFAR-10 [53] and ImageNet [54] yield
much different results: those patterns look rather random
compared to the results from LISA or MNIST. The reason
might be that in CIFAR-10, images in the same category are
still very different, such as two different cats, but in LISA, two
images of STOP signs do not look as different as two cats.
For the experimental results of creation attacks, we see that as
distances increase, success rates decrease a little (Fig. 15), but
much better than the camera-aware attacks (Table I), because
the optimization formulation helped find those optimal attack
patterns with high confidence.
2) Alteration attacks: The emulated and experimental re-
sults of alteration attacks are shown in Fig. 15. Compared
with creation attacks, alteration attacks perform a bit worse,
especially for large distances (three meters or further). This
is because the classifier also “sees” the benign image in the
background and tends to classify the entire image as the benign
class. Moreover, the alignment of attack patterns and the benign
signs is imperfect. However, when we compare Fig. 15 with
Table I for camera-aware alteration attacks, we can see large
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Figure 16: System-aware attack pattern examples.
improvements. Fig. 16b provides an example of system-aware
alteration attacks in the perception domain, which were trying
to alter the (printed) STOP sign into other signs: they look
“blue” as the channel model predicted. The fifth column is not
showing as it is STOP.
A misclassification matrix of emulated alteration attacks at
8× 8 is given in Table II. The overall attack success rate was
75%. Each cell denotes the success rate of altering a benign
class (actual) into a target class (predicted). Most of them
are 100%, but the SCHOOL sign, for example, was the most
difficult to perturb into (the 3rd column) and yet not that hard
to perturb from (the 3rd row), probably because it is in green
(RGB: 0-255-0) and in an opened-envelope shape, while all the
others are either red (255-0-0) or yellow (255-255-0) colors,
and either polygon or rectangle shapes.
B. Attack Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of our attacks in terms of different
datasets, environments, and cameras.
1) Different image datasets: Here we evaluate our system-
aware attacks on two other datasets, CIFAR-10 [53] and
ImageNet [54], by emulation only because previous results
show that our attack emulation yields similar success rates as
experimental results.
a) CIFAR-10: The network architecture and model hyper
parameters are shown in Table VII and Table VIII in Ap-
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Figure 17: System-aware attacks on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
pendix A, which are identical to [29]. The network was trained
with the distillation defense [55] so that we can evaluate the
robustness of our attacks in terms of adversarial defenses. A
classification accuracy of 80% was achieved. The evaluation
procedure is similar to Algorithm 1. Results are shown in
Fig. 17. The overall trend is similar to the LISA dataset, but
the success rates are higher. The reason might still be the
large variation within one class (Section VI-A1), so that the
CIFAR-10 classifier is not as sure about one class as the LISA
classifier is, hence is more vulnerable to our attacks.
b) ImageNet: We used a pre-trained Inception V3 neural
network [56] for the ImageNet dataset to evaluate the attack
robustness against large networks. Since the pre-trained network
can recognize 1000 classes, we did not iterate all of them
(similar to [29]). Instead, for alteration attacks, we randomly
picked ten benign images from the validation set, and twenty
random target classes, while for creation attacks, the “benign”
images were purely black. Results are given in Fig. 17.
For high resolutions (≥ 15 × 15), the attack success rates
were nearly 100%. But as soon as the resolutions went down to
10×10 or below, the rates decreased sharply. The reason might
be that in order to mount successful targeted attacks on a 1000-
class image classifier, a large number of degrees of freedom
are required. 10 × 10 or lower resolutions plus three color
channels might not be enough to accomplish targeted attacks.
To verify this, we also evaluated untargeted alteration attacks
on ImageNet. Results show that when the resolutions are 1× 1
or 2×2, the success rates are 50% or 80%, respectively. But as
soon as the resolutions go to 3× 3 or above, the success rates
reach 100%. Lastly, similar to CIFAR-10, system-aware attacks
Table II: Emulated system-aware obfuscation attacks: misclas-
sification matrix at 8× 8-resolution.
Predicted
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1 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100
2 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100
3 100 0 100 100 100 100 0 97.2
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5 100 100 90 0 100 100 100 100
6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Figure 18: Outdoor experiment setup
on ImageNet were more successful than on LISA, because of
the high variation within one class.
2) Outdoor experiments: In order to evaluate system-aware
attacks in a real-world environment, we also conducted exper-
iments outdoor (Fig. 18), where the camera was put on the
hood of a vehicle that was about to pass an intersection with
a STOP sign. The attacker’s projector was placed on the right
curb, and it was about four meters away from the camera. The
experiments were done at noon, at dusk and at night (with the
vehicle’s front lights on) to examine the effects of ambient
light on attack efficacy. The illuminances were 4× 104 lx,
4× 103 lx, and 30 lx, respectively. The experiments at noon
were unsuccessful due to the strong sunlight. Although more
powerful projectors [57] could be acquired, we argue that a
typical projector is effective in dimmer environments (e.g.,
cloudy days, at dawn, dusk, and night, or urban areas where
buildings cause shades), which accounts for more than half of
a day. See Sec. VII-A for more discussion on ambient lighting
conditions.
Results (Tab. III) of the other cases show that the success
rates are 30% lower than our in-lab experiments (the four-
meter case from Fig. 15), because we used our in-lab channel
model directly in the road experiments without retraining it,
and also the environmental conditions are more unpredictable.
Moreover, the attack rates on altering some classes (e.g., the
STOP sign) into three other signs (e.g., YIELD) were 100%,
which is critical as an attacker can easily prevent an autonomous
vehicle from stopping at a STOP sign.
3) Different cameras: Previously, we conducted GhostIm-
age attacks on Aptina MT9M034 camera [43] designed for
autonomous driving. Here, we evaluate two other cameras, an
Aptina MT9V034 [58] with a simpler lens design, and a Ring
indoor security camera [47] for surveillance applications.
a) Aptina MT9V034: We mounted system-aware creation
attacks against the same camera-based object classification
system as in Section VI-A but we replaced the camera with
Table III: Outdoor alteration attack success rates
Success rates of Noon Dusk Night
Overall 0% 51% 42.9%
STOP → YIELD 0% 100% 100%
STOP → ADDEDLANE 0% 100% 100%
STOP → PEDESTRIAN 0% 100% 100%
the Aptina MT9V034 camera. Since this camera has a smaller
aperture size and also a simpler lens design than Aptina
MT9M034, for a distance of one meter, only 16×16-resolution
attack patterns could be achieved (previously we had 32× 32
at one meter). We did not train a new channel model for this
camera, so the attack success rate at one meter was only 75%,
which is 25% lower than the Aptina MT9M034 camera. As the
distances increased up to four meters, creation attacks yielded
success rates as 46.25%, 33.75%, and 12.5%, respectively.
Another reason why the overall success rate was lower is that
even though the data sheet of Aptina MT9V034 [58] states
that the camera also has the auto exposure control feature, we
could not enable the feature in our experiments. In other words,
system-aware creation attacks did not benefit from the exposure
control. This, on the other hand, indicates the robustness of
GhostImage attacks: Even without taking advantage of exposure
control, the attacks were still effective.
b) Ring indoor security camera: We tested GhostImage
untargeted attacks against a Ring indoor security camera [47]
on the ImageNet dataset. To demonstrate that our attacks can
be applied to surveillance scenarios, we assume the camera
would issue an intrusion warning if a specific object type
[59] is detected by the Inception V3 neural network [56]. The
attacker’s goal is to change an object for an intruder class to
a non-intruder class. However, we could not find “human”,
“person” or “people”, etc. in the output classes, we instead
used five human related items (such as sunglasses) as the
benign classes. We found six images from the validation set
of ImageNet, of which top-1 classification results are one of
those five benign classes. The six images were displayed on a
monitor. For each benign image, we calculated ten alternative
3× 3 attack patterns (the highest resolution at one meter by
the Ring camera). Results show that our attacks achieve an
overall untargeted attack success rate of 100% (Tab. IV).
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss practical challenges to GhostImage
attacks, speculate as to effective countermeasures, and outline
variations on the original attacks.
A. Practicality of GhostImage Attacks
Moving targets and alignment: The overlap of ghosts and
objects of interest in images must be nearly complete for the
attacks to succeed. In the cases of a moving camera (e.g., one
mounted to a vehicle), the attacker needs to be able to accurately
track the movement of the targeted camera, otherwise the
Table IV: GhostImage untargeted alteration attacks against
Ring camera on ImageNet dataset in perception domain
Index Benign Class Rate Common Prediction
19992 fur boat 100% geyser, parachute
21539 sunglasses 100% screen, microwave
22285 sunglasses 100% plastic bag, geyser
31664 sarong 100% jellyfish, plastic bag
2849 sweatshirt 100% laptop, candle
26236 puncho 100% table lamp
attacker can only sporadically inject ghosts. Note that, although
aiming (or tracking) moving targets is generally challenging in
remote sensor attacks (e.g., the AdvLiDAR attack [16] assumes
the attacker can achieve this via camera-based object detection
and tracking), existing works [22], [35] have demonstrated
the feasibility of tracking cameras and then neutralizing them.
This paper’s main goal is to propose a new category of camera
attacks, which enables an attacker to inject arbitrary patterns.
Conspicuousness: The light bursts around the light source
in Figures 1 and 8 may raise stealthiness concerns about our
attacks. However, according to our analysis in Sec. IV-B, such
bursts can actually be eliminated because the light source
can be outside of view (See Fig. 19 and [36]). Even the light
source has to be in the frame (due to the lens configuration), we
argue that a camera-based object classification system used in
autonomous systems generally make decisions without human
input (for example, in a Waymo self-driving taxi [2], no human
driver is required, or in a Tesla car [3], real-time images would
not typically be displayed). Additionally, the attack beam is
so concentrated that only the victim camera can observe it
while other human-beings (e.g., pedestrians) cannot (Fig. 18).
Finally, the light source only needs to be on for a short amount
of time, as a few tampered frames can cause incorrect actions
[60].
Projectors, lenses, and attack distances: Based on our
model (Eq. 7) and experiments (Tab. IX), the illuminance on
the camera from the projector would better be 4/3 of the part
from ambient illuminance (to achieve a success rate of 100%).
Since Illuminance ∝ Luminance · r2throw/d2, in order to carry
out an attack during sunny days (typically with Illuminance
40× 103 lx), a typical projector (e.g., [61] with Luminance
9× 103 lm) should work with a telephoto lens [62] (with a
throwing radio 100) at a distance of one meter. For longer
distances or brighter backgrounds, one can either acquire a more
powerful projector (e.g., [57] with 75× 103 lm), or combine
multiple lenses to achieve much larger throwing ratios (e.g.,
two Optela lenses [62] yield 200, etc.), or both.
Ghost effect dependence: There are several challenges an
attacker needs to overcome to launch GhostImage attacks. First,
the attacks rely largely on ghost effects; if ghosts cannot be
induced, or if they are not significant enough, the attacks might
be infeasible against a given camera (lens). However, this is
unlikely because these effects occur in most cameras (e.g.,
Apple iPhones [63], [64]). Moreover, no “flare-free” lens exists
to the best of our knowledge (even with anti-glare coatings). In
addition, if ghost effects are unavailable to the attacker there
are other optics effects available, such as blooming effects [65],
that can also be leveraged to produce GhostImage-like attacks.
Knowledge of the targeted system We assume that both
types of attackers know about the camera matrix M and color
calibration matrix Hc. We note that the attacks can still be
effective without such knowledge but with it the attacks can be
more efficient. For example, the attacker may choose to lower
their attack success expectation but the probability of successful
attack may still be too high for potential victims to bear (e.g.,
a success rate of only 10% might be unacceptable for reasons
of safety in automated vehicles). This challenge can be largely
eliminated if the attacker is able to purchase a camera of the
same, or similar, model as used in the targeted system and use
it to derive the matrices. Although the duplicate camera may
not be exactly the same to the target one, the channel model
would still be in the same form with approximate, probably
fine-tuned parameters (via retraining), thanks to the generality
of our channel model. Lastly, assuming white-box knowledge
on sensors is widely adopted and accepted in the literature,
e.g., the AdvLiDAR attack [16]. Also, we assume white-box
attacks on the neural network, though this assumption can
be eliminated by leveraging the transferability of adversarial
examples [66]–[69].
Object detection: We have assumed that the object detector
can crop out the region of the image which contains the
projected ghost pattern(s). Though it cannot be guaranteed
that an object detector will automatically include the ghost
patterns, we note that a GhostImage attacker could design
ghost patterns that cause an object detector to include them
[32], [70] and, at the same time, the cropped image would fool
the subsequent object classifier.
B. Attack Variations
Should ghost effect be not available, we investigated alter-
native strategies that still allow an attacker to cause misclassi-
ficaiton of objects of interest. inject adversarial noise, absent
ghosts and/or flares, without placing the light source directly
in front of the object, which would allow for straightforward
detection of the attack. For example, using a beamsplitter that
merges two light beams coming from two directions: one is the
light reflected from the object the attacker wishes to obscure
and the other is the light from the projector. The merged light
beams enter the targeted camera as a superposition of the
original object and the adversarial pattern, with the resulting
image able to fool the classifier. Appendix D provides details
on this attack vector and its efficacy.
Finally, while projectors provide an attacker with the greatest
control over adversarial patterns, and hence the ability to spoof
complex objects, we have found that RGB lasers [71] can
be used at greater distances to spoof simple objects. It may
also be possible for an attacker to use multi-laser systems, or
even flashlights [72], to create complex patterns akin to the
decorative lights displayed on Christmas trees [73].
C. Countermeasures
The most straightforward countermeasure to GhostImage
attacks is flare elimination, either by using a lens hood [26],
[74] or through flare detection. Lens hoods are generally not
favored as they reduce the angle of view of the camera, which
is unacceptable for many autonomous vehicle and surveillance
applications. Note that there are so-called liquid lenses that
can change its focal length by reshaping itself, which results
in only one reflection path, hence fewer flares. However, such
lenses have not been widely adopted yet [75].
Currently, we are working on a defense where we first
identify all flares/ghosts in an image, and then detect if a ghost
contains malicious patterns. However, the challenges include:
First, ghosts are typically transparent thus hard to detect
[76]; Second, natural ghosts are so common and varied that
false positives can occur inevitably; Third, just as adversarial
noise can be crafted to deceive neural networks an analogous
procedure could be used to craft flares/ghosts that deceive
flare/ghost detectors.
A complementary line of defense would be to make neural
networks themselves robust to GhostImage attacks. Existing
approaches against adversarial examples (e.g., [55], [77]–[79],
etc.) are ill-suited for this task, however, as GhostImage attacks
do not necessarily follow the constraints placed on traditional
adversarial examples in that perturbations do not have to be
bounded within a small norm, meanwhile these defenses were
not designed for arbitrarily large perturbations.
Another complementary approach of defense is to exploit
prior knowledge, such as GPS locations of signs, to make
decisions, instead of only depending on real-time sensor
perception (though this approach would not work for sponta-
neous appearance of objects, e.g., in the context of collision
avoidance). Sensor redundancy/fusion could also be helpful:
autonomous vehicles could be equipped with multiple cameras
and/or other types of sensors, such as LiDARs and radars, which
would at least increase the cost of the attack by requiring the
attacker to target multiple sensors.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Since our attack spans two domains, in this section we review
both sensor attacks and adversarial examples.
A. Sensor attacks
Perception in autonomous and surveillance systems occurs
through sensors, which convert analog signals into digital
ones that are further analyzed by computing systems. Recent
work has demonstrated that the sensing mechanism itself is
vulnerable to attack and that such attacks may be used to bypass
digital protections [19], [20]. For example, anti-lock braking
system (ABS) sensors have been manipulated via magnetic
fields by Shoukry et al. [80], microphones have been subject
to inaudible voice and light-based attacks [13], [81], and light
sensors can be influenced via electromagnetic interference to
report lighter or darker conditions [12]. The reader is referred
to [19], [20] for a review of analog sensor attacks.
Existing remote attacks against cameras [15], [22], [23] are
denial-of-service attacks and do not seek to compromise the
object classifier as our GhostImage attacks do. Those attacks
that do target object classification [30], [32], [82] are either
digital or physical domain attacks (i.e., they need to modify the
object of interest in this case a traffic sign or road pavement,
physically or after the object has been captured by a camera)
rather than perception domain attacks [19], [20]. Li et al. [34]’s
attacks on cameras require attackers to place stickers on lenses,
to which is generally hard to get access. Similarly, several
light-based attacks [60], [83], [84] fall within the domain of
physical attacks, as opposed to our perception domain attack,
because these approaches illuminate the object of interest with
visible or infrared light. We did not consider infrared noise
in our attacks as it can be easily eliminated from visible light
systems using infrared filters. Attacks on LiDAR systems [14]–
[16], [85] are also related to this work; however, these attacks
are considerably easier to carry out than our visible light-based
attacks against cameras because attackers can directly inject
adversarial laser pulses into LiDARs without worrying about
blocking the object of interest.
B. Adversarial examples
State-of-the-art adversarial examples can be categorized
as digital [28], [29], [33], [52], [66]–[68], [86]–[91], or
physical domain attacks [30]–[32], [69], [83], [87], [92]–[96]
in which objects of interest are physically modified to cause
misclassification. The latter differs from GhostImage attacks in
that we target the sensor (camera) without needing to physically
modify any real-world object. Another line of work focuses on
unrestricted adversarial examples [97]–[99], though they are
limited in the digital domain.
In terms of defending neural networks from adversarial ex-
amples, be they physical or digital, schemes include modifying
the network to be more robust [33], [55], [77]–[79], [100]–
[105], while other defenses have focused on either detecting
adversarial inputs [106]–[111] or transforming them into benign
images [109], [112], [113], most of which are under the general
assumption of bounded perturbations, hence are inapplicable to
our attacks; while others could also be bypassed by being taken
as constraints in the optimization formulation. As this work
mainly focuses on sensor attacks, similar to [16], [30]–[32]
we leave the validation of defenses as future work.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented GhostImage attacks against
camera-based object classifiers. Using common optical effects,
viz. lens flare/ghost effects, an attacker is able to inject arbitrary
adversarial patterns into camera images using a projector. To
increase the efficacy of the attack, we proposed a projector-
camera channel model that predicts the location of ghosts,
the resolution of the patterns in ghosts, given the projector-
camera arrangement, and accounts for exposure control and
color calibration. GhostImage attacks also leverage adversarial
examples generation techniques to find optimal attack patterns.
We evaluated GhostImage attacks using three image datasets
and in both indoor and outdoor environments on three cameras.
Experimental results show that GhostImage attacks were able
to achieve attack success rates as high as 100%, and also have
potential impact on autonomous systems, such as self-driving
cars and surveillance systems.
APPENDIX A
NEURAL NETWORKS AND DATASETS
Here we present the architectures of two neural networks
(Tables V and VII) and their hyper-parameters (Table VIII).
The balanced LISA dataset is also detailed in Table VI.
Figure 19: There are ghosts but the light source is out of view.
Table V: Neural network architecture for LISA dataset
Layer Type Model
ReLU convolution 64 8× 8-filters
ReLU convolution 128 6× 6-filters
ReLU convolution 128 5× 5-filters
ReLU Fully-connected 256
Softmax 8
APPENDIX B
DETAILED PROJECTOR-CAMERA MODEL PARAMETERS
Table IX lists all parameters of the projector-camera channel
model. The color calibration matrix is
Hc =
0.5 0 0.10 0.5 0
0 0 0.8
 ,
and the camera matrix is
M =
−0.1406 0.0537 −0.0200 0.84520.0321 0.0547 −0.1385 0.4893
−0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0009
 .
APPENDIX C
DIRECT PROJECTION USING AN ADDITIONAL LENS
Lemma C.1. However the additional lenses are placed, the
image of noise cannot overlay with the image of the object
without obscuring the object.
Proof. We are going to prove that even with an additional
concave lens. See Figure 20 for a diagram, where a concave
lens L1 is placed between an object AB and a camera’s convex
lens L2. L1’s focal length is f1 and L2’s is f2. The distance
between L1 and L2 is d2. The noise source N is right upon
A. From the perspective of L2, AB is completely obfuscated
by L1; in other words, all light rays of AB that go through
L2 must at first go through L1. Both the object and the noise
source share the same object distance to L1, which is d1. The
image of AB formed by L1 is A1B1, and N1 is the image of
N . The distance between A1B1 and L1 is d3. The image of
formed by L2 is A2B2 and N2. The distance between A2B2
and L2 is d4.
In order to solve a problem consisting of multiple lenses, we
usually analyze each lens individually and sequentially. That
is, we calculate the image formed by the first lens, then use
that image as the input to the second lens.
Table VI: Balanced LISA dataset
Index Sign Name Quantity
0 Added Lane 80
1 Merge 80
2 Pedestrian Crossing 80
3 School 77
4 Signal Ahead 80
5 Stop 80
6 Stop Ahead 80
7 Yield 80
Table VII: Neural network architecture for CIFAR-10 dataset
Layer Type Model
ReLU convolution 64 8× 8-filters
ReLU convolution 128 6× 6-filters
ReLU convolution 128 5× 5-filters
ReLU convolution 64 3× 3-filters
Max Pooling 2× 2
ReLU convolution 128 3× 3-filters
ReLU convolution 128 3× 3-filters
Max Pooling 2× 2
ReLU Fully-connected 256
ReLU Fully-connected 256
Softmax 10
For L1, the input is AB, thus we have
1
d1
+
1
d3
=
1
f1
, (17)
and the magnification is calculated as
M =
|N1B1|
|NB| =
|A1B1|
|AB| =
|A1N1|
|AN | =
d3
d1
, (18)
from which we know that N1 does not overlap with A1B1.
For L2, the input is A1B1 (L2 cannot “see” AB directly
because AB is completely obfuscated by L1), thus we get
1
d2 + d3
+
1
d4
=
1
f2
, (19)
and the magnification is calculated as
M =
|N2B2|
|N1B1| =
|A2B2|
|A1B1| =
|A2N2|
|A1N1| =
d4
d2 + d3
, (20)
from which we know that N2 does not overlap with A2B2. As
a result, no matter how we place the additional concave lens,
we cannot apply the noise to the image of the object without
obscuring the object. The proof for a convex lens follows the
same logic.
APPENDIX D
BEAMSPLITTING METHOD
See Figure 21a for a diagram of this method, where a
beamsplitter is used to merge two light beams coming from two
directions. The light beams coming from the object (marked
in red) get reflected and transmitted, i.e., the beamsplitter does
not obscure the object. The transmitted portions go into the
camera, forming an image of the object. The light beams from
Table VIII: Training hyper-parameters
Parameter Value
Learning Rate 0.1
Momentum 0.9
Dropout 0.5
Batch Size 128
Epochs 50
Table IX: Channel model parameter examples
Description Symbol Value
Throwing ratio rthrow 20
Physical size of ghosts Sf 0.0156 cm2
Projection resolution PO 1024× 768
Flare booster ρ 30
Bulb intensity Ta [0, 1]
Ambient illuminance Ienv 300 lx (indoor)
Projector ill. I 400 lx (at 1 m)
Projector max ill. Imax 1200 lx (at 1 m)
Camera matrix M See below
Color calibration matrix Hc See below
In Equation 6 a 8.9
In Equation 6 b 6.7
In Equation 6 ct -7.8
In Equation 6 cd 0.25
the light noise source (marked in blue) also get reflected and
transmitted. The reflected portions (instead of the transmitted
portions) are captured by the camera, forming an image of the
noise. Two images overlap as a potential adversarial example,
depicted as a small magenta (red plus blue) stop sign in the
camera.
An in-lab experimental setup is shown in Figure 21b. In
this setup, we used the NEC projector [114] as the light noise
source. Instead of using an expensive beamsplitter, we found
out that a single piece of glass could also function like a
beamsplitter. We placed a piece of white paper in front of the
projector’s lens to reduce the projected image size (otherwise
the projected image becomes too large even within a small
throwing distance). This does not change the attack plausibility
because the imager can clearly capture the noise pattern on
the paper. These elements were placed in a way that the noise
image (from the paper) would overlap with the image of the
object from the view of the camera. A misclassification matrix
is shown in Figure 22 where an overall attack success rate of
55% was achieved.
d4
N
A
A1
N1
A2
N2
B
B1
B2
L1
L2
f1
d2
d3
d1
f2
Figure 20: Noise N cannot overlap with the image of the
object AB even with an additional concave lens.
Noise source
Beamsplitter
Camera
Object
STOPSTOP
(a) Noise injection with a beam-splitter/glass
(b) Experiment setup with a piece of glass.
Figure 21: The beamsplitter method setup.
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